

Desarrollo de la criptografía Guerras mundiales—hasta ahora

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- ▶ The First World War, trench warfare
- ▶ The telegram
- ▶ Encryption and transmission
- ▶ British interception and decipherment
- ▶ Consequences


Mexican-American War 1846–1848: USA gain large tracts of Mexican territory, *Alta California* and *Santa Fe de Nuevo México* (including California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico).

Franco-German War 1870–1871: German troops occupy Paris within a few weeks. Germany gains Alsace-Lorraine and becomes unified under Emperor Wilhelm I.

The First World War (in the West)

- ▶ 28 July 1914 to 11 November 1918. Central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and others) against the Entente (France, Great Britain, Russia, and others).
- ▶ 1 August 1914: German troops march through Belgium towards Paris (Schlieffen plan), but are stopped by the French and British forces.
- ▶ The ensuing trench war exhausts both sides morally, militarily, and financially.

The Schlieffen plan



French attack on German trench



The Zimmermann telegram, Januar 1917

- ▶ The leading German generals, Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937) convince Emperor Wilhelm II.: we can only win the war if we enter unrestricted U-boat warfare.



The Zimmermann telegram, Januar 1917

- ▶ Worry: the US enter the war on the side of the Entente.
- ▶ Arthur Zimmermann (1864–1940), German foreign minister, starts an inept attempt to stop the US: Mexico shall reconquer the lost territories of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.



The Zimmermann telegram, January 1917

9 January	Imperial U-boat decision
13 January	Zimmermann signs message
16 January	telegram(s) from Berlin to Washington in 0075
19 January	telegram from Washington to Mexico in 13040
31 January	Germany declares unrestricted U-boat warfare
3 February	US president Wilson breaks relations with Germany
10 February	Room 40 receives 13040 message from Mexico
22 February	Reginald Hall gives decrypt to Walter Page
24 February	President Wilson receives the telegram
1 March	story published in US newspapers
3 March	Zimmermann admits responsibility
6 April	US congress declares war on Germany

100 years Zimmermann telegram



Cinvestav

SIMPOSIO EN CONMEMORACIÓN DE LOS 100 AÑOS DEL ENVÍO DEL TELEGRAMA DE ZIMMERMANN

El Departamento de Computación del Cinvestav organiza el presente Simposio en conmemoración del centenario del envío del telegrama en clave de Arthur Zimmermann, secretario de Asuntos Exteriores alemán al gobierno de México. Invitando a Estudiantes, académicos y funcionarios del Cinvestav del Instituto Politécnico Nacional y de otras instituciones de Educación Superior, y pública en general.

POENCIAS

Prof. Dr. Joachim von zur Gathen
Profesor emerito
Bonn-Rhein International Center for Information Technology

Una ponencia presenta al mundo anglosajón del telegrama y discute los aspectos históricos y políticos de este evento. El autor es un experto en criptografía y ha trabajado en el campo de la criptografía durante más de 30 años. El autor es un experto en criptografía y ha trabajado en el campo de la criptografía durante más de 30 años. El autor es un experto en criptografía y ha trabajado en el campo de la criptografía durante más de 30 años.

Dr. Guillermo Morales Luna
Investigador Titular en el Departamento de Computación del Cinvestav-IPN

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Captán Ziro, Historiador Sergio Martínez Torres
Ex. Súl. de Archivo Histórico, ISENER

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Lunes
16 enero 2017
10:00 am

Auditorio del edificio de Ingeniería Eléctrica y Computación, CINVESTAV-IPN, Zacatenco, CDMX
<https://www.cs.cinvestav.mx/SimposioZimmermann2017>


Codebooks for encryption:

- ▶ 13040: 11 000 words, broken by the British cipher bureau *Room 40* in 1915. This was guessed at by the Germans.
- ▶ 0075: more secure construction, not broken in early 1917. The commercial U-boat *Deutschland* had brought it to the German embassy in Washington in December 1916, but it was not available in Mexico.

The British *HMS Telconia* had cut all transatlantic cables out of Germany on 5 August 1914. The Germans had the following four options for **transmission**:

- ▶ Another U-boat.
- ▶ Transmission between the high-power radio station at Nauen near Berlin and at Sayville on Long Island NY.
- ▶ The *Swedish roundabout*, via Stockholm and Buenos Aires.
- ▶ On US diplomatic cable from Berlin to Washington, which US ambassador James Gerrard had allowed for messages concerning peace negotiations.

Possible transmission routes



The Zimmermann telegram in English

Most secret. Decipher yourself.

We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavour in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral.

In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: Conduct war jointly. Conclude peace jointly. Substantial financial support and consent on our part for Mexico to reconquer lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to your Excellency.

Your Excellency will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain, and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence, and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.

Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace.

The Zimmermann telegram: a closer look

AS162 pr. 12. Januar 1917. p.m. 000001 Eilt sehr.
Berlin, den 13. Januar 1917. AS 162^I =====

I. Gesandter von Eckardt <sup>x hat Mexico
geh. Chiffreverschlüssel</sup>
Ang. III. Tel. 5/2
Stockholm 120
für Mexico
In Postziffern. Mit geh. x
(Chiffre vers.)

Mexico ANr. 2.

Mit U-Boot am 15.d.M.
über Washington.

Chiffreverschlüssel Ang. 1 ist mit Chiffre
13040 zu chiffrieren, der in Mexico vor
handen und, soweit bekannt, nicht kompromittiert ist.
W.D. H. Grf Montgelas z.g. Mtz

Nach Abg.
W. VUZ.

Geh. w. vorgelegt 15/1.

W. vorz. 1.2.17.

¹⁰²⁰
15/1. geh. w. vorgelegt
Zitat 1/2.

† Eine Garantie wird dadurch
nicht ausgesprochen.
‡ Californien dürfte für Japan
zu reservieren sein

1020

1. } Entnommen 11.
2. } für U-Boot

Ganz geheim. Selbst entziffern.

Wir beabsichtigen, am 1. Februar
uneingeschränkten U Boot Krieg zu
beginnen. Es wird versucht werden,
Amerika trotzdem neutral zu erhalten.

Für den Fall, daß dies nicht gelingen
sollte, schlagen wir Mexico auf folgen
der Grundlage Bündnis vor: Gemein
same Kriegführung, und Friedensschluß

Reichliche finanzielle Unterstützung
und Einverständnis unsererseits, daß
Mexico in Texas, Neu-Mexico, Arizona †
früher verlorenes Gebiet zurückerober.
Defensivbündnis nach Friedensschluß, wo
fern es Mexico gelingt, Japan in Bünd
nis einzubeziehen. Regelung im
Einzelnen Ew. pp. überlassen.

Four possible routes: U-boat, German radio stations, Swedish roundabout, US diplomatic cable.

- ▶ U-boat: trip cancelled.
- ▶ Radio: no encrypted messages allowed.
- ▶ Sweden or US?

How to prove it did not go via Sweden? “co-NP”.

My stroke of luck: Maria Keipert, the knowledgeable director of the archive of the German Foreign Office, showed me the log book of encrypted messages (“*Geheime Ausgänge*”) to Sweden. Several entries in January 1917, but **not** the Zimmermann telegram.


The British **intercepted** all transatlantic cable transmissions, including US diplomatic messages and the Zimmermann telegram in 0075.

Conclusion: The Zimmermann telegram (in German: *Mexiko-Depesche*) went in code 0075 on the undersea cable connecting the US embassy in Berlin to Washington. It was handed to the German ambassador, Graf Johann Heinrich Andreas Hermann Albrecht von Bernstorff, decrypted, re-encrypted in code 13040, and sent via Western Union to the German minister, Heinrich von Eckardt, in Mexico.

This shows the difficulty of transmitting secret keys over a public line. Is this possible at all?

Computer science enters cryptography: yes, it is possible. Diffie & Hellman 1976. Public-key cryptography.

Zimmermann telegram in 13040

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED		WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM		MTC	
Full Day Message	<input type="checkbox"/>			Time Paid 3300	
Day Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Night Message	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Night Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Please check, mark, or X on the box if service desired. OTHERWISE THE TELEGRAM WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS A FAST DAY MESSAGE.		NEW YORK CARLTON, PRESIDENT		via Galveston JAN 29 1917	

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

GERMAN LEGATION
MEXICO CITY

130 13042 13401 8501 115 3528 416 17214 6491 11510
 18147 18222 21560 10247 11518 23677 13605 3494 14936
 98092 5905 11311 10392 10371 0302 21290 5161 59095
 23571 17504 11289 18276 18101 0317 0228 17694 4473
 22284 22200 19452 21589 67893 5569 13918 8958 12137
 1333 4725 4458 5905 17166 13851 4458 17149 14471 6706
 13850 12224 6929 14991 7382 15857 67893 14218 56477
 5870 17553 67893 5870 5454 16102 15217 22801 17138
 21001 17388 7146 23638 18222 6719 14331 15021 23845
 3156 23552 22096 21804 4797 9497 22464 20855 4377
 23610 18140 22260 5905 13347 20420 39689 13732 20667
 6929 5275 18507 52242 1340 22049 13339 11265 22295
 10439 14814 4178 6992 8784 7632 7357 6926 52262 11267
 21100 21272 9346 9559 22464 15874 18502 18500 15857
 2188 5376 7381 98092 16127 13486 9350 9220 76036 14219
 5144 2831 17920 11347 17142 11264 7667 7762 15099 9110
 10482 97556 3569 3070

BEPHSTOPFF.

Charge German Embassy.

863-2019/1724

Room 40: one page of code 13040 deciphered

385	391	397	403 (13)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
		12 Argentina	29 Canada
386	392	398	404 (14)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
		59 Valparaiso	24 Cas (10) ...
397	393	399	405 (15)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
			20 ...
388	394	400 C	406 (16)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
05 ...		05 ...	
389	395	401 (17)	407 (17)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12 ...		10 ...	5 ...
390	396	402 (18)	408 (18)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

396

076	Venezuela
10	Venezuela
22	
34	
46	Vera Cruz
53	
61	
72	Verdun
89	Vereinigten Staaten
95.	V.S.v. (A)esolka

- ▶ *Room 40*, the cryptanalytic unit of the British, founded in August 1914. Director: Captain Reginald Hall, later Admiral and Sir Reginald.
- ▶ The cryptanalyst Nigel de Grey can read parts of the intercepted telegram (“drop copy”) in 0075. Not readable: *Texas, New Mexico, Arizona.*
- ▶ Edward Thurstan, British legation in Mexico City, bribed an operator at the post office. De Grey writes: *Although we had the 13040 version and knew Eckardt had no 7500 book, without disclosing our drop copy source, we could not produce it. Nor could we prove that the telegram had actually been delivered in Mexico to the German Legation and had not been faked in London . . . How we succeeded in stealing the copy I never knew but money goes a long way in Mexico and steal it we did.*

- ▶ Room 40 receives the 13040 copy, “el resto fue sencillo”: de Grey decipheres it, Hall gives the solution to the US ambassador Walter Page in London, who passes it to US President Woodrow Wilson.
- ▶ David Kahn: “the greatest intelligence coup of all times”.
- ▶ Published in newspapers on 1 March, including *El Universal*. Public outcry in the US, Congress declares war on the Central Powers on 6 April 1917.
- ▶ 11 November 1918: victory of the Entente, followed by the Treaty of Versailles.
- ▶ Challenge to historians: contradictory, erroneous, and intentionally false statements by participants and in the literature.

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AÑO 2. TOMO 2. SEPTIEMBRE VEINTE Y SEIS. MEXICO, JUEVES 1º DE MARZO DE 1917. PÁGINA 112. NUMERO 112

En EE. UU. se Habla de una Pretendida Alianza Entre Mexico, Alemania y Japon

La Madre Inmortal a Través de la Historia

El Universal publica en sus páginas una gran cantidad de artículos de interés general, política, economía, cultura y deportes. Este día se publican artículos sobre la situación internacional y el comercio exterior.

Se Publica una Copia de las Instrucciones Enviadas por Zimmermann Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros a Von Eckardt Representante Teutón en México

El Ministerio de Negocios Extranjeros ha publicado una copia de las instrucciones enviadas por el Sr. Zimmermann, Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros de Alemania, al Sr. Von Eckardt, representante teutón en México. Estas instrucciones detallan las políticas y acciones que se deben seguir en el país.

SEBAN CONSERVADOS PARA GRADUALIDAD SE ESTUBO LA NUEVA LEY SOBRE EL PETROLIO

El Sr. Zimmermann, Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros de Alemania, ha expresado su opinión sobre la nueva ley sobre el petróleo que se está considerando en México. Él cree que se deben conservar ciertos aspectos para una transición gradual.

Nuevos Derechos Sobre Exportación de Metales

El Sr. Zimmermann ha expresado su opinión sobre los nuevos derechos sobre la exportación de metales que se están considerando en México. Él cree que se deben considerar los intereses de los productores.

CONTRATACIONES PARA "EL UNIVERSAL"

El Sr. Zimmermann ha expresado su opinión sobre las contrataciones para el periódico "El Universal". Él cree que se deben considerar los intereses de los contratistas.

"El Universal"
102 PAGINAS
5 Centavos en la Capital
10 en los Estados

UNIVERSAL

MAÑANA

DE 1917

Publicado como periódico de segunda clase, el 25 de noviembre de 1916, en la Administración de Correos de México.

NUMERO 152

CINE AMERICA
de José María, de
Domingo María y
Serrano
"EL PELIGRO AMARILLO"
16 episodios, 33 partes.
Film de manufactura americana.
Argumento amoroso y val.

Guerra Entre Mexico, Alemania y Japón

Se Publica una Copia de las Instrucciones Enviadas por Zimmerman Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros a Von Eckardt Representante Teutón en México

PRESA ASOCIADA.
necesario para EL UNIVERSAL.
WASHINGTON, febrero 28.—La Prensa Asociada está en apuro de revelar que Alemania, impondrá con su campaña submarina sin restricción y contando con sus consuecristas, prouso: va a lanzar en el océano y la Flota Mexicana para declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos si no permanecen neutrales.

Según este plan, perfectamente concebido por los alemanes, se pediría al Japón, por conducto de México, que abandonara a sus aliados y se uniera a los enemigos de los Estados Unidos para atacarlos.
México, en caso de llevar a la práctica este plan, comunicaría Texas, Nuevo México y Arizona, y, además, habría un tremendo apoyo financiero, repartiéndose, al mismo tiempo, el

botín con la Alemania victoriosa, en lo que le toca de Europa.
El arreglo de los últimos detalles se dejó al ministro plenipotenciario de Alemania ante el gobierno del señor Carranza, von Eckardt, quien radica en la ciudad de México, y quien, en fecha diecisiete de enero próximo pasado, recibió copias de las instrucciones y firmadas por el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Alemania, Zimmerman, en el particular.

La Misión de Von Eckardt era Proponer una Alianza con el Japón

Lo primero que tenía que hacer von Eckardt, era procurar que el gobierno de México se pusiera al habla con el Japón, para atraerlo e inducirlo a inclinarse en la guerra, del lado de los teutones, rompiendo sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos.
Estas instrucciones fueron transmitidas al Ministro von Eckardt, por conducto del embajador en Washington von Bornstorff, quien en estos momentos viaja con rumbo a su patria, haciendo uso de pasaportes que le fueron proporcionados por un gobierno enemigo del suyo, y contra quien conspira.

El gobierno alemán trató de pintar a México una situación completamente distinta de la que realmente es, para le informó que los aliados habían sido completamente derrotados, que los teutones habían triunfado en toda la línea y que dominaban el mundo por medio de la campaña submarina sin restricciones.

El Gobierno Americano Adquiere una Copia de la Nota de Zimmermann a Von Eckardt

Una copia de la nota enviada por el Ministro de Relaciones, Zimmermann al Ministro von Eckardt, está en poder del gobierno americano, y dice textualmente.

"Con fecha primero de febrero, debimos iniciar nuestra campaña submarina sin restricción. A pesar de esto, teniendo la intención de hacer todo a clase de esfuerzos, a fin de que los Estados Unidos permanecieran neutrales, si nuestras intenciones se ven frustradas, programamos una alianza con México, bajo las siguientes condiciones; que juntos entráramos en la guerra, y juntos estaremos a la hora de la paz. Nosotros le daremos un amplio apoyo económico, y toda clase de ayuda para que México reconquiste el territorio perdido de Nuevo México, Arizona y Texas. Los detalles se darán al buen juicio y patriotismo de usted para el arreglo definitivo."

Según este plan, perfectamente concebido por los alemanes, se pediría al Japón, por conducto de México, que abandonara a sus aliados y se uniera a los enemigos de los Estados Unidos para atacarlos.
México, en caso de llevar a la práctica este plan, comunicaría Texas, Nuevo México y Arizona, y, además, habría un tremendo apoyo financiero, repartiéndose, al mismo tiempo, el botín con la Alemania victoriosa, en lo que le toca de Europa.

"Queda usted desde luego advertido que debe informar al señor Presidente de México de las instrucciones anteriores, siempre bajo la mayor reserva, ten presente como sobrepeso la ruptura con los Estados Unidos, y aconsejar que juntos entráramos en la guerra, y juntos estaremos a la hora de la paz."


El gobierno alemán trató de pintar a México una situación completamente distinta de la que realmente es, para le informó que los aliados habían sido completamente derrotados, que los teutones habían triunfado en toda la línea y que dominaban el mundo por medio de la campaña submarina sin restricciones.

"Siervo llamar la atención del señor Presidente de México sobre que la campaña submarina está obteniendo resultados sumamente halagadores y que estamos seguros que dentro de muy pocos meses Inglaterra se verá obligada a hacer la paz?"

(Riseve en la Sa. plian.)

- ▶ Von Eckardt presents the German offer to the Mexican government on 20 February 1917. Mexican President Venustiano Carranza rejects it on 14 April: “era una locura pensar que Alemania realmente iba a poder cumplir con esa oferta de ayuda militar” (Felipe Ávila).
- ▶ German U-boats sink many ships, but the ground troops are exhausted and cave in after the massive US intervention.

SM U 35 torpedoes HMS Maplewood in April 1917



- ▶ Zimmermann admits authorship of the telegram in the German parliament on 3 March 1917.
- ▶ Strong criticism by various Members: Zimmermann *has played a brilliant argument into Wilson's hand to rally the American people in unison around him.* Zimmermann: *I share the opinion that the Mexicans are unable to wage war successfully against the United States . . . My intention was to convince Carranza to start marching as soon as possible . . . It was important to me to avoid exposing our faithful field-gray uniforms to new enemies . . . In this war, moral has been filed away . . . Mexico has no weapons in the modern sense, but the irregular gangs are sufficiently supplied with weapons to stir up discomfort and unrest in the border states of America.*
- ▶ Why did Zimmermann admit the telegram's origin? My speculative answer: because he did not see anything wrong with it.

French plans 1915




- ▶ Austria-Hungary is cut up into various countries. Poland is created as an independent state and given parts of Germany and Russia; France regains Alsace and Lorraine and controls some parts of Germany in the west for several years.
- ▶ A democratic republic is created in Germany (*Weimar Republic*), but weakened by the compensation payments according to the Versailles treaty and massive internal strife by extremists. Ultimately, this gives rise to a Nazi government and the next disaster.

An 8-year old Afghan refugee in Bonn writes in December 2016:

I wish that sometime there will be no war in the world anymore.

The ENIGMA was the cryptographic workhorse of the German military in World War II. It was originally broken by Polish mathematicians, who then handed their methods to French and British cryptographers. The latter eventually built up a large organization, whose most famous member was Alan Turing and whose cryptanalytic successes helped to shorten the war considerably. The team also designed COLOSSUS, the world's first electronic (valve) computer, for use in the cryptanalysis of a different German cipher machine.

Enigma




In the 1920s, a new type of cryptographic hardware emerged electromechanical devices.

As is often the case in the history of ideas, the time was ripe and the possibilities of such a cryptosystem were realized by four men in four countries around the same time. Apparently the US American Edward Hugh Hebern (1869–1952) was the first to have the idea, in 1917, but made a US Patent application only in 1924. The German Arthur Scherbius applied for a patent on 23 February 1918, the Dutchman Hugo Alexander Koch(1870–1928) on 7 October 1919, and the Swede Arvid Gerhard Damm three days later.

Their common idea was to use an apparatus as described below. Hebern took just one rotor and Scherbius three rotors, and the latter became the ENIGMA. It was initially sold commercially. The German military adopted it as a major cryptographic tool starting in 1926. The ENIGMA went through several stages of development, some of which increased security and others decreased it, unwittingly. The estimated number of ENIGMA machines built is estimated at around 200 000. Like Henry Ford's *Tin Lizzy*, it could be had in any color, provided the color was black.

Enigma



Enigma




The main parts of an ENIGMA are:

- ▶ *plug board* (German: *Steckerbrett*),
- ▶ *key board*,
- ▶ *lamp board*,
- ▶ *rotors* (German: *Walzen*).

When you close the lid, the 26 keys show through the holes in the lid, the grooved aluminum *ringsenigma* ring attached to the rotors through the slits, and the letter at the top of a rotor through the three little windows. To the left of the left rotor, the *reflector* (German: *Umkehrwalze*) is fixed. Each of the 26 bulbs (the one at left in the middle row is a spare bulb) sits under a circular transparent cover with a letter printed on it.

Enigma



Fictitious machine: QWERTZ, no plug board. When you press the Q key, contact is made with the battery at left. Current flows (in red) to the top contact of the entry (right) rotor, named III. On all rotors, contacts are labelled QWERTZ from top to bottom. Thus the internal wiring of III implements the permutation $N = (\text{ERQ})(\text{TWZ})$. Current exits at E which is in direct contact with the E on the middle rotor named I, whose permutation is $M = (\text{EQT})(\text{RZW})$. It exits I at Q and enters the left rotor IV, permuting as $L = (\text{ERZQ})(\text{T})(\text{W})$. It exits at E, enters the reflector B, permuting as $R = (\text{EZ})(\text{QT})(\text{RW})$, and then passes back through Z, R, and W to exit III at T. Now current passes through the T lamp which lights up and closes the circuit with the battery. Then T is the encryption of Q at this state of the machine. When the key R is pressed next, the left rotor III has rotated by one position (cyclically downwards in the figure, so that T-R and Z-Q are connected) and—assuming that I has not moved—the lamp Q lights up.

The entry rotor turns by one letter (one 26th of a full turn) at each key stroke. Each rotor has a notch in one of 26 positions. When it is in the middle or at the left and the rotor to its right moves to the notched position, then the rotor turns by one letter. The *ring position* (German: *Ringstellung*) determines in which of 26 possible positions the ringenigma!ring is fixed to the rotor. This is only used in determining the machine's initial state before encryption.

The plug board consists of 26 connectors, some of which are connected in pairs. In the early days of the war, up to five pairs were connected, later exactly ten pairs. If E is not plugged (“unsteckered”), then current flows from the E key on the keyboard to the E connector on the entry rotor. But if E is plugged, say to Q, then current goes to the Q plug on the entry rotor. Then it transits the rotor assembly to exit at T, as above. If T is plugged to Z, this causes the Z lamp to light up, and the electrical circuit closes.

Two operators are required: Fritz reads out the cleartext aloud (Alice was not enlisted). Emil types it into the ENIGMA, which he has set up with the current keys, and reads the ciphertext letter by letter back to Fritz, who taps it in Morse code into his radio transmission unit. The recipients have to set up their ENIGMA in the same way, type in the ciphertext, and the plaintext lights up, letter by letter, to be copied down.

The setting used for encryption also serves for decryption, for the following reason. The encryption process can be viewed as a composition

$$\pi = P \circ N^{-1} \circ M^{-1} \circ L^{-1} \circ R \circ L \circ M \circ N \circ P \quad (0.1)$$

al:

of the plug board permutation P , the three rotor permutations N , M , and L , and the reflectorumkehrwalze permutation in the permutation group $\text{Sym}_{\mathbb{A}}$ over the 26-letter alphabet $\mathbb{A} = \{\text{A}, \text{B}, \text{C}, \dots, \text{Y}, \text{Z}\}$. Now if E is sent to Q on the plug board, that is, $P(\text{E}) = \text{Q}$, then also $P(\text{Q}) = \text{E}$. That means that applying P twice does not change anything: $P \circ P$ is the identity and P is an involution. The same also holds for R . When we take the composition $\pi \circ \pi$, adjacent terms cancel one after the other, and we also find $\pi \circ \pi$ to be the identity. Thus for any state, the ENIGMA permutation $\pi \in \text{Sym}_{\mathbb{A}}$ is an involution.

The original rules for setting up the ENIGMA contained a serious security flaw, which allowed Polish cryptanalysts to discover the rotor wiring.

During much of its wartime use, a daily secret key was distributed on paper to all participants in a network of ENIGMAS. It consists of the rotor choice and order, the ring setting, and the plugboard connections. The operator chooses two (supposedly random) 3-letter keys, the starting position HMD and the secret session key YOS. He uses the grooves on the rings to move the rotors into position HMD, visible through the small windows. Then he encrypts YOS to obtain the public session key, say XMZ. He starts a transmission by sending HMD and XMZ, sets his machine to YOS and starts encrypting and sends the resulting ciphertext. The recipient initializes his ENIGMA with the same daily secret key and starting position HMD, decrypts XMZ to obtain YOS, sets his machine to YOS and decrypts the received ciphertext.



Figure : Two ENIGMA rotors.





According to Kerckhoff's principle and the early commercial availability, the ENIGMA system must be assumed to be known to the enemy. Security only relies on the secret key. This consists of three parts:

- ▶ choice and sequence of rotors,
- ▶ setting of rotors,
- ▶ plugboard connections.

Initially, a further secret ingredient was the internal wiring of the rotors. It would be unwise to rely on this for security, because then a single stolen or captured machine would jeopardize the whole system. The reflector was fixed. The other rotors came in a wooden box. Initially, there were three to choose from, which allows six possible permutations. A later version had five to choose from, giving $5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 = 60$ possibilities. The three rotors of the German Navy ENIGMA could be chosen from a set of eight. This rotor setting was first changed monthly, later daily, and from mid-1942 on every eight hours. In 1943, a machine with four rotors was introduced.

Each rotor could be set in one out of 26 positions at the beginning of a transmission. The entry rotor advanced by one position every time a key was pressed. Like an odometer, it advances after 26 turns the middle rotor by one position and this then moves the leftmost rotor by one after 26 turns. With 60 choices for a sequence of three out of five rotors, 26^3 positions for them, and $26!/(2^{10} \cdot 6! \cdot 10!)$ choices for ten plugboard connections, the size of the key space is

$$158\,962\,555\,217\,826\,360\,000 \approx 1.6 \cdot 10^{20} \approx 2^{67}.$$

At the time, 67-bit security against exhaustive key search was more than enough. The ENIGMA's downfall were insecure operating modes and, above all, faulty behaviour of operators.

The second most common mistake of crypto system designers is to take a large key space as a guarantee of security. (The most common mistake is to take the designer's failure to break his own system as proof that everybody else will fail, too.)

No single event can be pinpointed that brought about Allied victory in the Second World War, but the British cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park played a vital role in many battles whose outcome eventually saved the world from brutal Nazi domination. It has been conjectured that *Ultra* shortened the war by two years, saving millions of lives on both sides. Alan Turing, a famous British mathematician and computer scientist, had proposed in 1937 a precise mathematical model of computers—the *Turing machine*—invented the idea that programs could be stored as data (namely, for his *universal Turing machine*), and proved that deceptively simple questions cannot be solved by any algorithm.

The cryptanalytic success against the ENIGMA was started by a team of Polish cryptographers, including the mathematician Marian Rejewski. They had completely solved the then standard machine in 1939. Their cryptanalysis of the ENIGMA rotors was completed in 1932. One of their main inventions was the *bombe*, an electromagnetic device simulating many ENIGMA runs on a fixed plaintext. On 25 July 1939, nine days before Hitler's blitzkrieg attack on Poland and while most people were still happy with the seeming success of appeasement politics at München, they were wise enough to share their secrets and machinery with French and British cryptographers. Later, they were treated in a cavalier way: while in exile in England, they were not allowed to participate in the British cryptanalytic effort.



Figure : The main building, the *manor*, at Bletchley Park, used by the administration, of course. The cryptanalysts worked in wooden huts. Umbrella and shorts illustrate the versatile weather of a Buckinghamshire summer day.

A vital ingredient to the initial Polish ENIGMA break was a classical espionage coup by the French Secret Service. Hans Thilo Schmidt, working in the *Chi-Stelle* of the *Reichswehrministerium* (cipher bureau of the Reich's Defense Ministry) offered his services in October 1932. Directed by Colonel Gustave Bertrand and under the codename Asché, he divulged many secrets. Among them were complete key schedules for certain periods. The French secret agent Lemoine, captured and interrogated by the Germans, betrayed Asché, who was arrested at home in Fürstenwalde and executed in July 1943.

The British Foreign Office set up a team of cryptographers at Bletchley Park on 4 September 1939, one day after Hitler attacked Poland. A little later, Turing joined the team. One of their main tasks became the breaking of the ENIGMA-encrypted communication between the German Navy headquarters at Kiel and the submarines in the North Atlantic. These inflicted crippling losses on Allied convoys from North America to Europe. After a long struggle, Bletchley Park started deciphering ENIGMA messages regularly in 1942. The resulting stream of deciphered data ran under the name of *Ultra*. The unfortunate U-boat captain who had just radioed his position to headquarters did not know that the US *Catalina* bombers dropping depth charges all around him were secretly directed by the brain of a mathematical genius.

At the highest level of secrecy, German military messages were enciphered on different systems, the *Siemens Geheimschreiber* and the *Lorenz SZ* (Schlüsselzusatz). The latter also used rotors, namely, twelve of them. But the principle differed from the ENIGMA's: the rotors generated a pseudorandom bit string, and each letter of the message was encoded by five bits, according to the standard *Baudot code*. These two bit streams were then added bitwise (XORed), just as one does in a one-time pad. By a brilliant stroke of cryptanalytic genius, the mathematician Bill Tutte discovered this principle. He was unwittingly aided by a German radioman who transmitted essentially the same message twice in secret key. And then Bletchley Park, in collaboration with British Post Office engineers, set out for one of their main achievements: the world's first computer. This COLOSSUS had about 1500 valves. Its input was fed on rapidly moving paper tape, at right in the figure, showing the replica now standing in the Bletchley Park museum.





Figure : COLOSSUS rebuilt at the Bletchley Park Museum.

Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman



* 1944




* 1945

New Directions in Cryptography, 1976

- ▶ Public-key cryptography
- ▶ Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- ▶ RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman; factoring large numbers), discrete logarithms, elliptic curves
- ▶ cryptography turns into a science, using computational complexity. Precise formulation of theoretical security. Necessary: $P \neq NP$.
- ▶ Current question: alternative basis for cryptographic security?

Elliptische Kurven



Quantum computers

Quantum computers can factor integers and compute discrete logarithms efficiently.

Question: will they ever be built with scalable size?



The D-Wave quantum computer.
“Post-quantum cryptography”



das puchel hat ein ent

Herzog Rudolf IV. von Österreich (1339–1365)