Routing in the Future Internet

Marcelo Yannuzzi

Graduate Course (Slideset 6) Institute of Computer Science University of the Republic (UdelaR)

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Department of Computer Architecture Technical University of Catalonia (UPC), Spain Institute of Computer Science University of the Republic (UdelaR), Uruguay

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Outline


- iBGP, eBGP, and Route Reflectors.
- ② Case study: Japanese Earthquake in 2011.
- Interdomain Traffic Engineering.
- Research challenges in interdomain routing.
 - Rounting convergence.
 - Outline of the scalability issues.
 - Churn and its impact on the DFZ.
 - Routing Policies: policy disputes, etc.
 - Traffic Engineering: solutions and research challenges.
 - Routing Security.

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iBGP, eBGP, and Route Reflectors.

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BGP flavors: iBGP and eBGP



Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Open Issues in Interdomain Routing: A Survey," IEEE Network, Nov./Dec. 2005.

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iBGP and Route Reflectors




Figure 1. Different i-BGP topologies: a) full-mesh i-BGP; b) i-BGP with route reflection.

Source: J. H. Park et al., "BGP Route Reflection Revisited," IEEE Communications Magazine, July 2012.

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Basic Operation of RRs...

Avoids the need of fully-meshed iBGP sessions, offering:

•
$$\frac{N(N-1)}{2} = O(N^2) \rightarrow \frac{K(K-1)}{2} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} C_i = O(N)$$

N: Number of BGP routers in the AS *K*: number of RR in the AS (note the full-mesh of RRs for redundancy) C_i : number of client iBGP routers connected to the *i*-th RR ($C_i < N$)

- RRs forward reachability information learned from an i-BGP speaker to another i-BGP speaker.
- Since BGP messages travel more than a single i-BGP hop inside the AS, it is possible to create loops.
- 2 new attributes are added to BGP update messages: ORIGINATOR_ID and CLUSTER_LIST.

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Advantages of using RRs...

- From $O(N^2)$ to O(N) iBGP sessions
- Reduces OPEX
- Reduces RIBs's sizes (RIB-in, Loc-RIB, and RIB-out)
 - **RIB-in:** each router maintains a RIB-in for each neighbor, which contains unprocessed routing information (i.e., before applying import policies). The total size with iBGP is (*N* − 1) × *p*_{*iBGP*} (*p*_{*iBGP*}: avg. number of prefixes per neighbor). Whereas with RRs: *K* × *p*_{*RR*}
 - Loc-RIB: stores the best route for each possible destination (i.e., after applying import policies across each RIB-in and running the BGP decision process).
 - **RIB-out:** contains the set of routes to be advertised to each neighbor after applying export policies (i.e., output filters)....note that the export policy to i-BGP neighbors is typically the same and that clients only need to keep *K* RIB-out internally.

Reduces churn

•but in practice things are not that simple....

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Known issues...

- RR may:
 - Decrease the network's robustness against failures
 - Introduce delayed routing convergence
 - Reduce path diversity within the AS
 - Adopt suboptimal routes
 - And even cause data forwarding loops




Figure 2. Route reflection with data forwarding loop.

Source: J. H. Park et al., "BGP Route Reflection Revisited," IEEE Communications Magazine, July 2012.

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• Reduced path diversity, delayed convergence, and suboptimal routes




Figure 3. RR chooses its best route.

Source: J. H. Park et al., "BGP Route Reflection Revisited," IEEE Communications Magazine, July 2012.

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 Note that R1 and R2 will use the routes through R4 and R5, respectively, since routes learned via e-BGP are typically preferred over routes learned from iBGP. However, R3 will be constrained by the RR selection.





Figure 3. RR chooses its best route.

Source: J. H. Park et al., "BGP Route Reflection Revisited," IEEE Communications Magazine, July 2012.

 Anbother example...note that upon failure of path Pa, router R1 cannot reach destination *d* anymore and will drop packets until the RR advertise Pb. R1 will also send eBGP withdraws on its eBGP sessions.



Source: V. Van den Schrieck et al. "BGP Add-Paths: The Scaling/Performance Tradeoffs," IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 28, NO. 8, OCTOBER 2010.

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 Coping with the problems through placement and RR hierarchy....though this comes at the cost of increased hop distance and path diversity reductions...





Figure 4. POP based route reflection.

Source: J. H. Park et al., "BGP Route Reflection Revisited," IEEE Communications Magazine, July 2012.

BGP Add-Paths


 Anbother approach: D. Walton et al. "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP," IETF draft-ietf-idr-add-paths-07.txt, June 2012.



Source: V. Van den Schrieck et al. "BGP Add-Paths: The Scaling/Performance Tradeoffs," IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 28, NO. 8, OCTOBER 2010.

BGP Add-Paths (cont.)


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 Source: V. Van den Schrieck et al. "BGP Add-Paths: The Scaling/Performance Tradeoffs," IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 28, NO. 8, OCTOBER 2010.

BGP Add-Paths (cont.)

 The reductions in eBGP churn come at the cost of an increase of the iBGP churn on non-best paths...



Source: V. Van den Schrieck et al. "BGP Add-Paths: The Scaling/Performance Tradeoffs," IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 28, NO. 8, OCTOBER 2010.

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Japanese Earthquake in 2011

 > 15,000 people dead and > 4,000 were missing even after 6 months of the disaster (90% due to the tsunami)




Figure 1: Earthquakes larger than Magnitude 4 in Japan for March 2011


Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

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Impact on NTT

- 1.5 million circuits for fixed-line services
- 6,700 pieces of base station equipment
- 15,000 circuits for corporate data communication services.
- 65,000 telephone poles were flooded or collapsed
- 6,300km of aerial cables were lost.
- Voice calls: capacity overloads due to a surge in calls.
- ...however, the Internet was impressively resilient to the disaster.

Japanese Earthquake in 2011 (cont.)



Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

Traffic on JP-US cables of IIJ (damaged and rerouted)



 Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

Link Failures and Restoration

Link up and link down events





Figure 5: Quake related link failure and restoration times

 Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

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OSPF add and drop events

(a) Neighbor events per hour interval



Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

BGP withdrawals seen by a neighbor AS




Figure 7: BGP withdrawals for our ISP in a neighboring ISP

Source: K. Cho et al. "The Japan Earthquake: the impact on traffic and routing observed by a local ISP," ACM SWID 2011, December 2011.

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Traffic Engineering goals differ...

Transit Providers

- Optimize the distribuition and exchange of large traffic volumes
- Performance differentiation for premium customers while exploiting economy of scale
- Even different goals depending on carrier's size and market niche
- Typically: considerable overprovisioning, min-max optimization cycles, optics penetration and keen on cross-layer aspects, and a lot of rule of the thumb (no real clue about the Traffic Matrix)

Non-transit Domains (e.g., enterprises)


- > 80% of the ASs in the Internet ... that means more the 32,000 ASs
- Typically: scarce overprovisioning though with sufficient redundancy, performance optimization (in general that means low delay with high service availability), and clearly, reduce as much as possible the Internet's costs.

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Traffic Engineering Transit Providers IP Layer

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
Egress Traffic Engineering



Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

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
Egress Traffic Engineering (cont.)



Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

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Ingress Traffic Engineering



network 138.48.0.0./16

Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.


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Routing in the Future Internet: Graduate Course, INCO, Montevideo, Uruguay, 2012.

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
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Ingress Traffic Engineering (cont.)



Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.


Ingress Traffic Engineering (cont.)



Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

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Ingress Traffic Engineering (cont.)



Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

But in practice things might look quite complex...




Figure 1. a) Scenario #1: multihomed ISP with links of different capacity, load sharing, and backup routing policy; b) scenario #2: multihomed ISP with NAP presence; c) scenario #3: multihomed ISP with NAP presence and SDH multiplexers.

 Source: M. Yannuzzi, X. Masip-Bruin, E. Grampin, R. Gagliano, A. Castro, M. German, "Managing interdomain traffic in Latin America: a new perspective based on LISP," IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 47, no. 7, July 2009.

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
Community-based Traffic Engineering

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Basics of Communities

- Communities attribute (RFC1997, RFC1998): It's a "Transitive" attiribute
- Used to mark routes that share a common property and thus must undergo a specific treatment
- It is mainly used for building more scalable routing configurations
-some providers also allow their customers to control the redistribution of their routes by the use of communities...

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
Source: K. Foster, "Application of BGP Communities," Internet Protocol Journal, June 2003.

Modus Operandi...

- Providers
 - Define their set of community values
 - And they configure specific actions, such as: "do not announce", "prepend as-path", or "change local-pref".
- Customers
 - Attach some of these communities to their routes to request the given treatment

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٠	6.6.6.0/24	with a	community	attribute	100:300
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7.7.7.0/24 with a community attribute 100:250

To R2:


- 6.6.6.0/24 with a community attribute 100:250
- 7.7.7.0/24 with a community attribute 100:300

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
Local Preference	Community Values	
130	100:300	
125	100:250	

Source: Cisco Systems, Inc.




Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

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
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
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Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at QofIS 2002.

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Limitations of Community-based TE

Main Issues

- Semantic of community values must be agreed and published
- Data models and data structure issues
- Requires manual configurations
- Transitivity contributes to additional churn

Redistribution Communities


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Proposed Modifications


- Standardized semantics
- Actions:
 - The attached route should not be announced to the specified BGP speakers.
 - The attached route should only be announced to the specified BGP speakers.
 - The attached route should be announced with the NO_EXPORT community to the specified BGP speakers.
 - The attached route should be prepended *n* times when announced to the specified BGP speakers.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Source: Presentation from B. Quoitin at NANOG25.

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


Figure 1. A simple Internet.




Figure 1. A simple Internet.




Figure 1. A simple Internet.




Figure 1. A simple Internet.





Figure 1. A simple Internet.

Figure 3: Customer-Initiated Black Hole to Defend Against a DoS Attack



Source: K. Foster, "Application of BGP Communities," Internet Protocol Journal, June 2003.

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
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Are Communities really used in Practice?


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 Source: B. Donnet and B. Quoitin, "On BGP Communities," ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 38 Issue 2, April 2008.


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 Source: B. Donnet and B. Quoitin, "On BGP Communities," ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 38 Issue 2, April 2008.

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 Source: B. Donnet and B. Quoitin, "On BGP Communities," ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 38 Issue 2, April 2008.

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...other TE objectives of Transit Providers

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Transit Providers (hot potato routing)




Fig. 1. Link failure causes router C to switch egress points from A to B for destination prefix p.

 Source: R. Teixeira et al., "TIE Breaking: Tunable Interdomain Egress Selection," IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 2007.

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
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More Ambitious Approaches...

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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The EuQoS Approach...




Source: X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi et al., "The EuQoS System: A Solution for QoS Routing in Heterogeneous Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, February 2007.

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The EuQoS Approach...



Source: X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi et al., "The EuQoS System: A Solution for QoS Routing in Heterogeneous Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, February 2007.

The EuQoS Approach...




Figure 4. *Example of EQ-BGP operation.*

 Source: X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi et al., "The EuQoS System: A Solution for QoS Routing in Heterogeneous Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, February 2007.

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The EuQoS Approach...





Figure 5. Comparison of EQ-BGP and BGP-4 convergence time after a route advertisement or a route withdrawal, in the case of: a) Ring topology; b) full mesh topology; c) Internet like topology.

Source: X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi et al., "The EuQoS System: A Solution for QoS Routing in Heterogeneous Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, February 2007.

The EuQoS Approach...




■ Figure 6. Scalability of EQ-BGP vs. BGP-4.

Source: X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi et al., "The EuQoS System: A Solution for QoS Routing in Heterogeneous Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, February 2007.

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Transit Providers Traffic Engineering at the Optical Layer

Marcelo Yannuzzi



Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.




Figure 2. a) Computation of the ENAW; b) advantage of the cost computation.

Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.

Input: NRI associated with each destination d PSI between OXCs s and d

Output: The best (path, wavelength) pair between s and d


- 1: Choose the (path, wavelength) pair with the minimum cost
- 2: If the costs are equal choose the path with the highest ENAW
- 3: If the ENAWs are equal choose the path with the shortest number of hops H, and assign the wavelength λ_i with the lowest identifier i
- 4: If the hops *H* are equal prefer the path with the highest ENAW to the remote border OXC
- 5: If more than one path is still available run BGP tie-breaking rules [4]

Figure 3. *IDRA RWA decision process.*

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.


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■ Figure 4. Pan-European reference network topology.

Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.



Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.

	Keepalive update interval ($K_T = 1$)				Keepalive update interval ($K_T = 3$)				Keepalive update interval ($K_T = 5$)			
	200 Erlangs	250 E	langs 300 Erlangs		200 Erlangs	250 Erlangs		300 Erlangs	200 Erlangs 250 E		Frlangs	300 Erlangs
IF	363.97	39.48	:	8.40	315.69	29.63		8.41	158.00 24.20		D	7.93
Traffic (Erlangs)	Routing messages OBGP		Routing messages IDRAs		Routing messages OBGP		Routing messages IDRAs		Routing messages OBGP		Routing messages IDRAs	
100	6,564,525		2,819,949		5,539,285		2,771,408		4,842,449		2,764,530	
150	7,907,963		3,013,904		6,544,983		2,961,622		5,574,075		2,876,943	
200	8,607,917		3,141,911		6,905,969		3,041,394		5,822,980		2,946,896	
250	8,992,258		3,288,572		7,033,482		3,149,322		5,864,259		3,027,520	
300	9,198,274		3,661,793		7,071,856		3,393,776		5,928,454		3,179,430	

Table 1. Improvement factor in the blocking requests for 200, 250, and 300 Erlangs, and overall number of routing messages exchanged.

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Toward a New Route Control Model for Multidomain Optical Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, June 2008.

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Traffic Engineering Non-transit Providers

Marcelo Yannuzzi

Routing in the Future Internet: Graduate Course, INCO, Montevideo, Uruguay, 2012. 82




Figure 1. The IRC model. IRC systems are composed of three modules: the monitoring and measurement module (MMM), the route control module (RCM), and a reporting and viewer module (RVM).

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.




Figure 2. Filtering process and interaction between the monitoring and measurement module (MMM) and the route control module (RCM) of a sociable route controller. The Randomized SRC Algorithm within the RCM is outlined in Algorithm 1.

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.


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Input: d – A target destination of network S {e} – Set of egress links of network S $P_{o}^{(d,t)}$ – Performance function to reach d through e at time t Output: e^{best} – The best egress link to reach target destination d 1: Wait for changes in $P_{ebest}^{(d,t)}$ 2: if $P_{ebest}^{(d,t)} - P_{e}^{(d,t)} < R_{tb} \forall e \neq e^{best}$ then go to Step 1 3: /* Egress link selection process for d */ Choose e' as $P_{\alpha'}^{(d,t)} = min\{P_e^{(d,t)}\}$ 4. Estimate the performance after switching the traffic 5. if $P_{ebest}^{(d,t)} - P_{e'}^{(d,t)}_{Estimate} \ge R_{th}$ then 6: Wait until $T_H = 0 / *$ Hysteresis Switching Timer */ 7: Switch traffic toward d from ebest to e' 8. $e^{best} \leftarrow e'$ 9. $P_{ebest}^{(d,t)} \leftarrow P_{e'}^{(d,t)}$ 10. 11: end if 12: /* End of egress link selection process for d */13: Go to Step 1

Algorithm 1. *Randomized SRC algorithm*.

Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.



■ Figure 3. Number of path switches (top) and <RTTs> (bottom) for L = 0.450 (left), L = 0.675 (center), and L = 0.900 (right).

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.




Figure 4. Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the RTTs for the 300 competing IRC flows, for $R_{th} = 1$, and for L = 0.450 (left), L = 0.675 (center), and L = 0.900 (right).

 Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.

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


Figure 5. CCDFs for IGP/BGP routing (top), SRC (center), and randomized IRC (bottom), for L = 0.450 (left), L = 0.675 (center), and L = 0.900 (right).

Source: M. Yannuzzi et al., "Improving the Performance of Route Control Middleboxes in a Competitive Environment," IEEE Network, Sept./Oct. 2008.

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- iBGP, eBGP, and Route Reflectors
- ② Case study: Japanese Earthquake in 2011.
- Interdomain Traffic Engineering
- Research challenges in interdomain routing

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Well-known issues in BGP ...

- Slow convergence
- Scalability Issues
- High churn rate of route advertisements
- Limited expressiveness of routing policies and TE control
- Security vulnerabilities
- 6 ...

These are due:

- ... in part to the utilization of path vectors
- ... in part to implementation decisions made in BGP

Slow Convergence

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
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- Depending on the location of the origin of an event and where the observation is made, a BGP convergence might vary between tens and several hundreds of seconds [C. Labovitz et al. 1999, 2001].
- This slow convergence is mainly caused by the *path hunting* performed by BGP.

Slow Convergence (cont.)


• The path exploration or path hunting phenomenon



Source: M. Yannuzzi, R. Serral-Gracia, and X. Masip-Bruin, "Chapter 3: Distance and Path Vector Routing Models," to be published in the book "MULTI-DOMAIN NETWORKS: A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE," Springer Series, Series Ed.: B. Mukherjee, Eds: N. Ghani, M. Peng, and I. Monga.

Slow Convergence (cont.)

• Another example of path-exploration:




Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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A detailed example of path exploration



 Source: C. Labovitz, A. Ahuja, A. Abose, and F. Jahanian, "Delayed Internet routing convergence," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 293–306, June 2001.

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A detailed example of path exploration (cont.)

Stage	Routing Tables	Messages Processed	Messages queued or delivered though not processed yet							
0	Steady State 0(*R, 1R, 2R) 1(0R, *R, 2R) 2(0R, 1R, *R)									
1	R withdraws its route 0(-, *1R, 2R) 1(*0R, -, 2R) 2(*0R, 1R, -)	$\label{eq:rescaled} \begin{array}{l} R \rightarrow 0 \ (w) \\ R \rightarrow 1 \ (w) \\ R \rightarrow 2 \ (w) \end{array}$	0 → 1 (01R) 0 → 2 (01R)	1 → 0 (10R) 1 → 2 (10R)	2 → 0 (20R) 2 → 1 (20R)					
2	1 and 2 receive the updates from 0 0(-, *1R, 2R) 1(-,-,*2R) 2(01R, *1R, -)	0 → 1 (01R) 0 → 2 (01R)	1 → 0 (10R) 1 → 2 (10R)	2 → 0 (20R) 2 → 1 (20R)	1 → 0 (12R) 1 → 2 (12R)	2 → 0 (21R) 2 → 1 (21R)				
3	0 and 2 receive the updates from 1 0(-,-,*2R) 1(-,-,*2R) 2(*01R, 10R,-)	1 → 0 (10R) 1 → 2 (10R)	2 → 0 (20R) 2 → 1 (20R)	1 → 0 (12R) 1 → 2 (12R)	2 → 0 (21R) 2 → 1 (21R)	0 → 1 (02R) 0 → 2 (02R)	2 → 0 (201R) 2 → 1 (201R)			
4	0 and 1 receive the updates from 2 0(-,-,-) 1(-,-,*20R) 2(*01R, 10R,-)	2 → 0 (20R) 2 → 1 (20R)	1 → 0 (12R) 1 → 2 (12R)	2 → 0 (21R) 2 → 1 (21R)	0 → 1 (02R) 0 → 2 (02R)	2 → 0 (201R) 2 → 1 (201R)	$0 \rightarrow 1 (w)$ $0 \rightarrow 2 (w)$	1 → 0 (120R) 1 → 2 (120R)		
5	0 and 2 receive the updates from 1 0(-, *12R,-) 1(-,-, *20R) 2(*01R,-,-)	1 → 0 (12R) 1 → 2 (12R)	2 → 0 (21R) 2 → 1 (21R)	0 → 1 (02R) 0 → 2 (02R)	2 → 0 (201R) 2 → 1 (201R)	$0 \rightarrow 1 (w)$ $0 \rightarrow 2 (w)$	1 → 0 (120R) 1 → 2 (120R)	0 → 1 (012R) 0 → 2 (012R)		
6	0 and 1 receive the updates from 2 0(-, *12R, 21R) 1(-,-,-) 2(*01R,-,-)	2 → 0 (21R) 2 → 1 (21R)	$0 \rightarrow 1 (02R)$ $0 \rightarrow 2 (02R)$	2 → 0 (201R) 2 → 1 (201R)	$\begin{array}{l} 0 \rightarrow 1 \ (w) \\ 0 \rightarrow 2 \ (w) \end{array}$	1 → 0 (120R) 1 → 2 (120R)	0 → 1 (012R) 0 → 2 (012R)	$1 \rightarrow 0 (w)$ $1 \rightarrow 2 (w)$		

 Source: C. Labovitz, A. Ahuja, A. Abose, and F. Jahanian, "Delayed Internet routing convergence," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 293–306, June 2001.

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A detailed example of path exploration (cont.)

Number of paths that can be potentially explored

For a complete graph of *n* nodes there exist O((n-1)!) distinct paths to reach a destination.

$$P(n) = (n-1) + (n-1)(n-2) + \cdots + (n-1)!$$

$$P(n) = (n-1)! \left[1 + \frac{1}{2!} + \frac{1}{3!} + \dots + \frac{1}{(n-2)!} \right] \approx (n-1)!$$

In slide 95: $n = 4 \Rightarrow P(4) = 3 + 3.2 + 3.2 + 3.2.1 = 15$ (15 different paths in total in the bad gadget)

Source: C. Labovitz, A. Ahuja, A. Abose, and F. Jahanian, "Delayed Internet routing convergence," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 293–306, June 2001.

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Convergence Time (usual metrics)

Time Metrics

- *T_{up}*: A previously unreachable destination becomes reachable through a path by the end of the event.
- *T_{down}*: A previously reachable destination becomes unreachable by the end of the event.
- *T_{short}*: A reachable destination has changed the path to a more preferred one by the end of the event.
- *T_{long}*: A reachable destination has changed the path to a less preferred one by the end of the event.
- *T_{equal}*: A reachable destination has changed the path by the end of the event, but the starting and ending paths have the same preference.
- *T_{pdist}*: The AS path is the same before and after the event, with some transient change(s) during the event.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009. 2001.

The effects of path exploration




Figure 10: Duration of Events.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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


Figure 11: Number of Updates per Event.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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


Figure 14: Duration of T_{down} events as seen by monitors at different tiers.

 Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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


Figure 15: Number of unique paths explored during T_{down} as seen by monitors at different tiers.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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


Figure 17: Duration of T_{down} events observed and originated in different tiers.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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One of the causes \rightarrow failures of eBGP peerings (cont.)

• ...almost 3 *T_{down}* events per minute....




Figure 19: Number of T_{down} events over time.

Source: R. Oliveira, B. Zhang, D. Pei, and L. Zhang, "Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet," IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 445-458, April 2009.

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Some proposals from the literature

- A. Bremler-Barr, Y. Afek and S. Schwarz, "Improved BGP Convergence via Ghost Flushing," in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2003.
- A. Feldmann, O. Maennel, Z. M. Mao, A. Berger, and B. Maggs "Locating Internet routing instabilities," in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Portland, USA, September 2004.
- D. Pei, M. Azuma, D. Massey, and L. Zhang, "BGP-RCN: improving BGP convergence through root cause notification," Computer Networks, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 175-194, 2005.
- J. Chandrashekar, Z. Duan, Z.-L. Zhang, and J. Krasky, "Limiting path exploration in BGP," in Proceedings of INFOCOM, Miami, USA, 2005.
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Industry ... the MRAI timers


T3 + 2.MRAI: 9 {7,8,6,4,1}

T3 + MRAI: 9 {7,5,3,1}

T3:9 {7, 2,1}

Min AS-path: $\{7,2,1\} \rightarrow 3$

Max AS-path: {7,8,6,4,1} → 5



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
Scalability Issues

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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Scalability Issues

FIB Evolution




Source: CIDR Report.

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
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Scalability Issues

RIB Evolution



A study from ARBOR Networks (2010)




- ISP1 one unique prefix (*p*), 22 routes total on PE routers, without intra-domain BGP effects
- Source: Danny McPherson (ARBOR Networks) "Prefixes, Paths & Internet Routing System Scalability," ARIN 25, April 2010.

- Consider N ASes: if an edge AS E connects to one of the N ASes, each AS has (N-1) paths to each prefix p announced by E
- When E connects to n of N ASes, each AS has at least n*N routes to p
 - In general the total number of routes to p can grow superlinearly with n
 - Edge AS multi-homing n times to the same ISP does NOT have this effect on adjacent ISPs
- It's common for ISPs to have 10 or more interconnects with other ISPs
 - when E connects to n ISPs, each ISP likely to see n*10 routes for p announced by E
- New ISPs in core, or nested transit relationships, often exacerbate the problem

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A study from ARBOR Networks (2010) (cont.)


Network Entries (Prefixes) vs. Path Entries



 Source: Danny McPherson (ARBOR Networks) "Prefixes, Paths & Internet Routing System Scalability," ARIN 25, April 2010.

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A study from ARBOR Networks (2010) (cont.)



 Source: Danny McPherson (ARBOR Networks) "Prefixes, Paths & Internet Routing System Scalability," ARIN 25, April 2010.

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Scalability Issues (cont.)

Region	IXPs	# of prefixes	De-aggregation factor (DF)
Africa	21	5K	3.46
Asia & Pacific	73	66K	2.81
Europe & Mid. East	123	67K	1.74
LA & Caribbean	24	26K	4.38
North America	88	124K	1.87
		Global BGP table	Global average
		288K	2.12

Table 1. Statistics by region (data of April 2009, extracted from [1] and APNIC [7]).

$$DF = \left(\frac{\text{Prefixes in the Global Routing Table}}{\text{Aggregatable Prefixes}} \right)$$

 Source: M. Yannuzzi, X. Masip-Bruin, E. Grampin, R. Gagliano, A. Castro, M. German, "Managing interdomain traffic in Latin America: a new perspective based on LISP," IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 47, no. 7, July 2009.

Scalability Issues (cont.)




Figure 2. Distribution of the de-aggregation factor as a function of the number of upstream providers in Latin America (data of April 2009, extracted from [1] and APNIC [7]).

Source: M. Yannuzzi, X. Masip-Bruin, E. Grampín, R. Gagliano, A. Castro, M. Germán, "Managing interdomain traffic in Latin America: a new perspective based on LISP," IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 47, no. 7, July 2009.

Churn


Marcelo Yannuzzi

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 The number of updates grew approximately by 200% over three years (2005–2007).




Growth in churn from a monitor in France Telecom's network.

Source: A. Elmokashfi, A. Kvalbein, C. Dovrolis, "On the scalability of BGP: the roles of topology growth and update rate-limiting," ACM CoNEXT 2008, Madrid, Spain, December 2008.

D. Papadimitriou, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 2009

Growth of Active BGP Entries (from Jan'89 to Mar'08)



(*) RIB/FIB ratio can vary from ~3 to 30 (function of number of BGP peering sessions at sample point)

Source: BGP Routing Table Analysis Reports - http://bgp.potaroo.net/index-bgp.html

28-08-2009


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D. Papadimitriou, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 2009

In practice...


- Static: DFZ routing tables
 - 300.000 prefix entries (growing at ~20-25% per year)
 - 30.000 ASs (growing ~15-20% per year)
- Dynamics BGP updates (routing convergence)
 - Average: 2-3 per sec. Peak: 0(1000) per sec.
 - BGP suffers from churn which increases load on BGP routers (due to link/nodes failures and traffic engineering)
 - BGP's path vector amplifies these problems



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
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One of the causes \rightarrow failures of eBGP peerings




 Source: O. Bonaventure, C. Filsfils, and P. Francois, "Achieving Sub-50 Milliseconds Recovery Upon BGP Peering Link Failures," ACM CoNEXT 2005, Toulouse, France, October 2005.

Downtime of eBGP peering links



 Source: O. Bonaventure, C. Filsfils, and P. Francois, "Achieving Sub-50 Milliseconds Recovery Upon BGP Peering Link Failures," ACM CoNEXT 2005, Toulouse, France, October 2005.

Other causes ... duplicates ...




 Source: Danny McPherson (ARBOR Networks) "Prefixes, Paths & Internet Routing System Scalability," ARIN 25, April 2010.

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Other causes ... duplicates ... (cont.)



Source: J. H. Park, D. Jen, M. Lad, S. Amante, D. McPherson, and L. Zhang "Investigating occurrence of duplicate updates in BGP announcements," Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM), Zurich, Switzerland, 2010.

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Cross dependencies




Figure 3. The complex and still unsolved balance between three interdomain routing objectives.

Source: M. Yannuzzi et al. "Open issues in interdomain routing: a survey," IEEE Network, Nov./Dec. 2005.


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Routing Policies and Traffic Engineering Limitations

Marcelo Yannuzzi


The effects of routing policies

The example of the bad gadget



 Source: T. Griffin T, and G. Wilfong G, "An Analysis of BGP Convergence Properties," ACM/SIGCOMM, Cambridge MA, USA, 1999.

The effects of routing policies (cont.)



Source: M. Yannuzzi, R. Serral-Gracia, and X. Masip-Bruin, "Chapter 3: Distance and Path Vector Routing Models," to be published in the book "MULTI-DOMAIN NETWORKS: A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE," Springer Series, Series Ed.: B. Mukherjee, Eds: N. Ghani, M. Peng, and I. Monga.

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Limited Control

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Limited Control

 BGP only offers a limited set of TE functionalities, whose effects are rarely predictable beyond the local domain.

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Limited Control

- BGP only offers a limited set of TE functionalities, whose effects are rarely predictable beyond the local domain.
- Basic TE requirements, such as route control remain unsolved in practice.

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
- BGP only offers a limited set of TE functionalities, whose effects are rarely predictable beyond the local domain.
- Basic TE requirements, such as route control remain unsolved in practice.
- A BGP router only advertises its best path toward a destination, i.e., the path contained in its FIB which the one used by the router to forward traffic to the destination. Clearly, this improves the overall scalability of the routing system, but adversely reduces the number of paths that can be used for improving the performance and reliability of inter-domain traffic.

Limited Control

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- Business-driven competition between domains together with the potentially conflicting nature of routing policies, make the accurate control of inter-domain routing an extremely hard problem to solve.

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Limited TE control



 Source: B. Quoitin and O. Bonaventure, "A Cooperative Approach to Interdomain Traffic Engineering," 1st Conference on Next Generation Internet Networks Traffic Engineering (NGI 2005), Rome, Italy, April 18-20th 2005.

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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Marcelo Yannuzzi

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 With the current implementation of BGP, a router has no means to find inter-domain paths subject to constraints, such as:

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 - with bounded delay

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 - with bounded delay
 - bounded losses

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 - with bounded delay
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 - ... or combinations of these.

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
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QoS Routing (QoSR): cumbersome and expensive both in CAPEX and OPEX
 providers have preferred to simplify the operation and maintenance of their
 networks and relied on capacity overprovisioning for improving the performance
 and reliability of their services.

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Single path in the FIB (... and the only one advertised)



 Source: W. Xu and J. Rexford, "MIRO: Multi-path Interdomain ROuting," ACM SIGCOMM, Pisa, Italy, September 2006.

Marcelo Yannuzzi

Routing in the Future Internet: Graduate Course, INCO, Montevideo, Uruguay, 2012. 130

Limited expressiveness of policies and TE control

	Traff	ie șeope	Predictable Scale		labilit.	Fiftigency							
BGP-based approaches													
Local-Pref	Out	Domain	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark								
IGP weights	Out	Domain	\checkmark	(\checkmark)	\checkmark								
Sel. announcements	In	Internet	Internet ✓ Not robust		Not robust to access link failure.								
More spec. prefixes	In	Internet	✓ Sensitive to filteri		Sensitive to filtering								
MED	In	Neighbor(s)	\checkmark	\checkmark	(√)	Requires bilateral agreement(s)							
AS-Path prepending	In	Internet		~	~	Limited granularity (given the diameter of the Internet). Impact difficult to predict.							
Communities	In	Internet		~	~	Impact difficult to predict. Large search space.							
Non BGP-based approaches													
RON, Detours	In/Out	Internet	~		~	Require modifications to end- systems. Rely on a large number of IP tunnels.							
NAT	In	Internet	~			Target multi-homed enterprise networks. Poses problem when one access link fails.							
New architectures	In/Out	Internet	~	~	~	Difficult to deploy in the current Internet.							

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 Source: B. Quoitin, "BGP-based Interdomain Traffic Engineering," Doctoral Thesis, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 2006.

Related Work: Ricciato et al. (2005) (cont.)




Figure 1. Reference interdomain scenario and PCE-based computation scheme.

F. Ricciato, U. Monaco, and D. Alì, "Distributed Schemes for Diverse Path Computation in Multidomain MPLS Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 138 - 146, June 2005.

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Related Work: Ricciato et al. (2005) (cont.)




Figure 2. Trap topology: The shortest path from i to e across b-c leaves the residual graph disconnected. Therefore, sequential computation fails to compute the diverse pair (i-a-d-c-e and i-b-f-g-e).

F. Ricciato, U. Monaco, and D. Alì, "Distributed Schemes for Diverse Path Computation in Multidomain MPLS Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 138 - 146, June 2005.

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Problem: 2 Link Disjoint Paths

Given a source node *s* and a destination node *t*, find two link-disjoint (*s*, *t*)-paths p_1 and ₂ of minimum total weight $W(p_1) + W(p_2)$.

- The path with minimum weight can be used as the primary path and the second one as the backup path.
- A relevant problem is to find two paths p₁ and p₂ that minimize max{W(p₁), W(p₂)}. The solution to this problem can achieve a better balance between the delay of the primary and backup path, but this problem is NP-hard.
- The standard algorithm used for solving this problem is the one provided by Suurballe and Tarjan (full topology must be known to every node in the network).

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Security Issues...

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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Add-on instead of built-in

- BGP lacks both path and origin authentication
- A BGP router can be perfectly used to advertise any possible (prefix, path vector) pair to the Internet
- This makes the inter-domain routing system extremely vulnerable to certain attacks, since both IP prefixes and routes can be hijacked

Adding security

Proposals	Origin authentication				Path authentication					
	Design	Security	Overhead		Design	Security	Overhead			
	Design		Time	Space	Design	Security	Time	Space		
S-BGP	Hierarchical PKI local memory	Strong	Low	High	Signatures in message	Strong	High	High		
soBGP	Hierarchical PKI separate database	Strong	Low	Low	Topology map	Medium	Low	Low		
psBGP	Distribute PALs local memory	Medium	Low	High	Signatures bit vector	Strong	Low	Very high		
IRV	Separate IRV servers	Strong	Low	Low	Distributed database	Medium	High	Low		
OA	Delegation OATs in message	Strong	Low	High	-	-	-	-		
S-A	-	-	-	-	Signature bit vector hash tree	Strong	Low	Very high		
APA	-	-	-	-	Aggregate signature, bit vector, hash tree	Strong	Low	Medium		
SPV	-	-	-	-	Hash chain hash tree one-time signature	Medium	Low	Very high		
Listen Whisper	-	-	-	-	Consistency check TCP flow	Low	Low	Low		

 Source: M. Zhao, S. W. Smith, and D. M. Nicol, "The performance impact of BGP security," IEEE Network, vol. 19, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 2005.

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Adding security (cont.)




Figure 1. Relative increase in convergence time of path authentication schemes relative to ordinary BGP.

 Source: M. Zhao, S. W. Smith, and D. M. Nicol, "The performance impact of BGP security," IEEE Network, vol. 19, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 2005.

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Adding security (cont.)





Figure 2. Relative increase in memory costs of path authentication schemes relative to ordinary BGP.

 Source: M. Zhao, S. W. Smith, and D. M. Nicol, "The performance impact of BGP security," IEEE Network, vol. 19, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 2005.


Current Activities at the IETF...



Issued Certificates Match

Source: G. Huston and R. Bush, "Securing BGP with BGPsec," Internet Protocol Journal, June 2011.

Current Activities at the IETF...




Source: G. Huston and R. Bush, "Securing BGP with BGPsec," Internet Protocol Journal, June 2011.

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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Current Activities at the IETF...




Source: G. Huston and R. Bush, "Securing BGP with BGPsec," Internet Protocol Journal, June 2011.

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The atomic approach ... a big mistake ...

Cross dependencies are strong, issues cannot be addressed isolatedly ...



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Questions?

Marcelo Yannuzzi

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